3rd DIVISION G.R. No. 183317 December 21, 2009 MARIWASA SIAM CERAMICS, INC.,
vs. THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
NACHURA, J.: petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45
The legitimacy of respondent as a labor organization must be affirmed. At the time of the union’s application for registration, the affiants were members and they comprised more than the required 20% membership for purposes of registration as a labor union. Article 234 of the Labor Code does not mandate that a union must maintain the 20% minimum membership requirement all throughout its existence.
To de-certify a union, it must be shown that there was misrepresentation, false statement or fraud in connection with the adoption or ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto; the minutes of ratification; or, in connection with the election of officers, the minutes of the election of officers, the list of voters, or failure to submit these documents together with the list of the newly elected-appointed officers and their postal addresses to the BLR.
The bare fact that two signatures appeared twice on the list of those who participated in the organizational meeting is not a valid reason to cancel respondent’s certificate of registration. The cancellation of a union’s registration has an impairing dimension on the right of labor to self-organization. For fraud and misrepresentation to be grounds for cancellation of union registration , such fraud and misrepresentation must be grave and compelling enough to vitiate the consent of a majority of union members.
Respondent could not have possibly committed misrepresentation, fraud, or false statements based on the alleged failure to indicate precisely the total number of employees in the bargaining unit, more so that it was able to comply with the 20% minimum membership requirement. Even if the total number of rank-and-file employees of petitioner is 528, while respondent declared that it should only be 455, it still cannot be denied that the latter would have more than complied with the registration requirement.
Wednesday, November 2, 2011
Tuesday, October 25, 2011
PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION vs CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL
1st DIVISION G.R. No. 180285 : July 6, 2010 MA. SOCORRO MANDAPAT, vs. ADD FORCE PERSONNEL SERVICES, INC. PEREZ, J.: Petition for Review on certiorari under Rule 45
Was Petitioner constructively dismissed?
There is constructive dismissal when an act of clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer has become so unbearable that the employee has no alternative but to resign. In the present case, there is no evidence of discrimination which made her employment unbearable.
Preventive suspension is allowed when the suspension is to prevent the employee under investigation him from causing harm or injury to the company and his fellow employees. Sections 8 and 9 of Rule XXIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as amended by Department Order No. 9, Series of 1997 state:
Section 8. Preventive suspension. The employer may place the worker concerned under preventive suspension only if his continued employment poses a serious and imminent threat to the life or property of the employer or of his co-workers.
Section 9. Period of suspension. No preventive suspension shall last longer than thirty (30) days. The employer shall thereafter reinstate the worker in his former or in a substantially equivalent position or the employer may extend the period of suspension provided that during the period of extension, he pays the wages and other benefits due to the worker. In such case, the worker shall not be bound to reimburse the amount paid to him during the extension if the employer decides, after completion of the hearing, to dismiss the worker.
There is Constructive dismissal when preventive suspension exceeds the maximum period without actual or payroll reinstatement or when it is for an indefinite period.
Although the show-cause memorandum did not specify a period, petitioner erred in concluding that her suspension was for an indefinite period. With her authority as a Sales Manager, she had the power to enter into contracts that would bind respondent. Respondent has every right to protect its assets and operations pending investigation of petitioner. The acts of disconnection of computer and internet access privileges are not harassment. Respondent clearly explained that such were a consequence of the investigation against her.
These were measures enforced by respondent to protect itself while the investigation was ongoing.
The mere allegations of threat or force do not support a finding of forced resignation. For intimidation to vitiate consent, the following requisites must concur:
1) the intimidation caused the consent to be given;
2) the threatened act was unjust or unlawful;
3) the threat is real or serious, there being evident disproportion between the evil and the resistance which all men can offer, leading to the choice of doing the act which is forced on the person to do as the lesser evil; and
4) it produces a well-grounded fear that the person from whom it comes has the means or ability to inflict the threatened injury to his person or property.
Petitioenr failed to prove these. No demand was made on petitioner to resign= she was merely given the option to either resign or face disciplinary investigation, which respondent had every right to conduct in light of the numerous infractions she committed . The final decision on whether to resign or face disciplinary action was on petitioner .
The Supreme Court upheld the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that petitioner resigned and was not constructively dismissed.
Was Petitioner constructively dismissed?
There is constructive dismissal when an act of clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer has become so unbearable that the employee has no alternative but to resign. In the present case, there is no evidence of discrimination which made her employment unbearable.
Preventive suspension is allowed when the suspension is to prevent the employee under investigation him from causing harm or injury to the company and his fellow employees. Sections 8 and 9 of Rule XXIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as amended by Department Order No. 9, Series of 1997 state:
Section 8. Preventive suspension. The employer may place the worker concerned under preventive suspension only if his continued employment poses a serious and imminent threat to the life or property of the employer or of his co-workers.
Section 9. Period of suspension. No preventive suspension shall last longer than thirty (30) days. The employer shall thereafter reinstate the worker in his former or in a substantially equivalent position or the employer may extend the period of suspension provided that during the period of extension, he pays the wages and other benefits due to the worker. In such case, the worker shall not be bound to reimburse the amount paid to him during the extension if the employer decides, after completion of the hearing, to dismiss the worker.
There is Constructive dismissal when preventive suspension exceeds the maximum period without actual or payroll reinstatement or when it is for an indefinite period.
Although the show-cause memorandum did not specify a period, petitioner erred in concluding that her suspension was for an indefinite period. With her authority as a Sales Manager, she had the power to enter into contracts that would bind respondent. Respondent has every right to protect its assets and operations pending investigation of petitioner. The acts of disconnection of computer and internet access privileges are not harassment. Respondent clearly explained that such were a consequence of the investigation against her.
These were measures enforced by respondent to protect itself while the investigation was ongoing.
The mere allegations of threat or force do not support a finding of forced resignation. For intimidation to vitiate consent, the following requisites must concur:
1) the intimidation caused the consent to be given;
2) the threatened act was unjust or unlawful;
3) the threat is real or serious, there being evident disproportion between the evil and the resistance which all men can offer, leading to the choice of doing the act which is forced on the person to do as the lesser evil; and
4) it produces a well-grounded fear that the person from whom it comes has the means or ability to inflict the threatened injury to his person or property.
Petitioenr failed to prove these. No demand was made on petitioner to resign= she was merely given the option to either resign or face disciplinary investigation, which respondent had every right to conduct in light of the numerous infractions she committed . The final decision on whether to resign or face disciplinary action was on petitioner .
The Supreme Court upheld the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that petitioner resigned and was not constructively dismissed.
TOTALITY OF INFRACTIONS DOCTRINE IN LABOR RELATION
2nd DIVISION G.R. No. 143511 November 15, 2010 PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, vs. JOEY B. TEVES, PERALTA, J.: review on certiorari
Petitioner argues that respondent's past infractions could be to justify respondnet's dismissal due to a subsequent similar offense and that respondent's absences without prior notice, despite previous disciplinary actions, should be considered in its totality and not in isolation .
There was no valid cause for respondent's dismissal.
Even assuming that respondent's absenteeism constitutes willful disobedience, it does not warrant his dismissal. Not every case of insubordination or willful disobedience deserves the penalty of dismissal. There must be a reasonable proportionality between the offense and the penalty.
Management has the prerogative to discipline its employees and to impose appropriate penalties,pursuant to company rules and regulations. But management prerogatives must be exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer’s interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws and valid agreements. While the employer has its own interest to protect, and may terminate an employee for just cause, such prerogative must be exercised without abuse of discretion, and tempered with compassion and understanding. The employer should bear in mind thatwhat is at stake is the employee’s very livelihood .
Respondent's absence from August 23 to September 3, 1990 was justified as there was prior notice. His absence from May 29 to June 12, 1991, although unauthorized, was not at all unjustified. Thus, his unauthorized and unjustified absence from February 11 to 19, 1991, which is his second unauthorized absence, does not merit the penalty of dismissal.
Where a worker has committed an infraction, a penalty less punitive may suffice.
Petitioner contends that respondent's length of service should be taken against him. The instant infraction committed by respondent during his eleven-year stay with petitioner did not involve the betrayal of petitioner's trust and confidence. Moreover, there was no basis for respondent's termination, on the ground that he had committed his third unauthorized absence within the three-year period as discussed earlier.
Since respondent was illegally dismissed , he is entitled to reinstatement, without loss of seniority rights and the payment of backwages from the time his compensation was withheld until his reinstatement on November 12, 1997. Sicne respondent's absence from February 11 to 19, 1992 was unjustified and unauthorized, his suspension for thirty days is in order. The amount equivalent to the thirty-day suspension, which respondent should have served for his absence on February 11 to 19, 1992, should be deducted from the backwages to be awarded to him.
Petitioner argues that respondent's past infractions could be to justify respondnet's dismissal due to a subsequent similar offense and that respondent's absences without prior notice, despite previous disciplinary actions, should be considered in its totality and not in isolation .
There was no valid cause for respondent's dismissal.
Even assuming that respondent's absenteeism constitutes willful disobedience, it does not warrant his dismissal. Not every case of insubordination or willful disobedience deserves the penalty of dismissal. There must be a reasonable proportionality between the offense and the penalty.
Management has the prerogative to discipline its employees and to impose appropriate penalties,pursuant to company rules and regulations. But management prerogatives must be exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer’s interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws and valid agreements. While the employer has its own interest to protect, and may terminate an employee for just cause, such prerogative must be exercised without abuse of discretion, and tempered with compassion and understanding. The employer should bear in mind thatwhat is at stake is the employee’s very livelihood .
Respondent's absence from August 23 to September 3, 1990 was justified as there was prior notice. His absence from May 29 to June 12, 1991, although unauthorized, was not at all unjustified. Thus, his unauthorized and unjustified absence from February 11 to 19, 1991, which is his second unauthorized absence, does not merit the penalty of dismissal.
Where a worker has committed an infraction, a penalty less punitive may suffice.
Petitioner contends that respondent's length of service should be taken against him. The instant infraction committed by respondent during his eleven-year stay with petitioner did not involve the betrayal of petitioner's trust and confidence. Moreover, there was no basis for respondent's termination, on the ground that he had committed his third unauthorized absence within the three-year period as discussed earlier.
Since respondent was illegally dismissed , he is entitled to reinstatement, without loss of seniority rights and the payment of backwages from the time his compensation was withheld until his reinstatement on November 12, 1997. Sicne respondent's absence from February 11 to 19, 1992 was unjustified and unauthorized, his suspension for thirty days is in order. The amount equivalent to the thirty-day suspension, which respondent should have served for his absence on February 11 to 19, 1992, should be deducted from the backwages to be awarded to him.
ILLEGAL STRIKE
9. Illegal Strike
2nd DIVISION [G.R. Nos. 158786 & 158789, October 19, 2007] TOYOTA MOTOR PHILS. CORP. WORKERS ASSOCIATION (TMPCWA), et.al. VS. NLRC, et.al. G.R. NOS. 158798-99
TOYOTA MOTOR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION VS. TOYOTA MOTOR PHILIPPINES CORP. WORKERS ASSOCIATION (TMPCWA), VELASCO, JR., J.: petition under Rule 45
The alleged protest rallies in front of the DOLE and at Toyota plants constituted illegal strikes.
Ludwig Teller identifies six (6) categories of an illegal strike:
(1) contrary to a specific prohibition of law, such as strike by employees performing governmental functions; or
(2)violates a specific requirement of law[, such as Article 263 of the Labor Code on the requisites of a valid strike]; or
(3)is declared for an unlawful purpose, such as inducing the employer to commit an unfair labor practice against non-union employees; or
(4)employs unlawful means in the pursuit of its objective, such as a widespread terrorism of non-strikers [for example, prohibited acts under Art. 264(e) of the Labor Code]; or
(5)is declared in violation of an existing injunction[, such as injunction, prohibition, or order issued by the DOLE Secretary and the NLRC under Art. 263 of the Labor Code]; or
(6)is contrary to an existing agreement, such as a no-strike clause or conclusive arbitration clause.
There was an on-going labor dispute arising from Toyota’s refusal to recognize and negotiate with the Union, thus became the subject of the notice of strike filed by the Union on January 16, 2001.
A strike means any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. A labor dispute includes any controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of the employer and the employee.[35]
It is the substance of the situation and not its appearance which is controlling.[36] The term strike encompasses not only concerted work stoppages, but also slowdowns, mass leaves, sit-downs, attempts to damage, destroy, or sabotage plant equipment and facilities, and similar activities.[37]
Once the DOLE Secretary assumes jurisdiction and certifies the case for NLRC compulsory arbitration , parties must revert to the status quo ante, something . that This the Union and individual respondents did not comply with.
There was no work disruption in the two Toyota plants, but the Union and its members picketed and performed concerted actions in front of the Company premises, violating the assumption of jurisdiction and certification Order of the DOLE Secretary. The Union, by its mass actions, inflamed an already volatile situation. The strikes committed from March 17 to April 12, 2001, were initially legal as the legal requirements were met. However, these became illegal because unlawful means were employed, in violation of Art. 264(e).
Union officers are liable for unlawful strikes or illegal acts during a strike. The responsibility of union officials is greater.
Member’s liability depends on participation in illegal acts: when he knowingly participates in an illegal act during a strike. Under [the rule of vicarious liability], mere membership in a labor union serves as basis of liability for acts of individuals, or for a labor activity, done on behalf of the union. The union member is made liable on the theory that all the members are engaged in a general conspiracy, and the unlawful acts of the particular members are viewed as necessary incidents of the conspiracy. It has been said that in the absence of statute providing otherwise, the rule of vicarious liability applies.
Are the 227 striking employees entitled to separation pay? In a slew of cases, the Court did not award separation pay or financial assistance to union officers and members who were separated from service due to their participation in or commission of illegal acts during strikes. Based on existing jurisprudence, the award of separation pay to the Union officials and members in the instant petitions cannot be sustained.
Henceforth the Supreme Court allows separation pay as a measure of social justice only where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. Where the reason for the valid dismissal is, for example, habitual intoxication or an offense involving moral turpitude, like theft or illicit sexual relations with a fellow worker, the employer may not be required to give the dismissed employee separation pay, or financial assistance, or whatever other name it is called, on the ground of social justice.
Compassion for the poor is an imperative of every humane society but only when the recipient is not a rascal claiming an undeserved privilege. Social justice cannot be permitted to be refuge of scoundrels any more than can equity be an impediment to the punishment of the guilty. Those who invoke social justice may do so only if their hands are clean and their motives blameless and not simply because they happen to be poor.
One last point: it is high time that employer and employee cease to view each other as adversaries. When they consider only their own self-interests, and act only with their own benefit in mind, both parties fail to realize that they both have a stake in the business. The employer wants the business to succeed, considering the investment that has been made. The employee in turn, also wants the business to succeed, as continued employment means a living, and the chance to better one’s lot in life. If this becomes a source of conflict, there are various, more amicable means of settling disputes and of balancing interests that open avenues for understanding and cooperation between the employer and the employee. Even though strikes and lockouts have been recognized as effective bargaining tools, they only provide short-term solutions by forcing concessions from one party; but staging such strikes would damage the working relationship between employers and employees, thus endangering the business that they both want to succeed. The more progressive and truly effective means of dispute resolution lies in mediation, conciliation, and arbitration, which do not increase tension but instead provide relief from them. In the end, an atmosphere of trust and understanding has much more to offer a business relationship than the traditional enmity that has long divided the employer and the employee.
2nd DIVISION [G.R. Nos. 158786 & 158789, October 19, 2007] TOYOTA MOTOR PHILS. CORP. WORKERS ASSOCIATION (TMPCWA), et.al. VS. NLRC, et.al. G.R. NOS. 158798-99
TOYOTA MOTOR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION VS. TOYOTA MOTOR PHILIPPINES CORP. WORKERS ASSOCIATION (TMPCWA), VELASCO, JR., J.: petition under Rule 45
The alleged protest rallies in front of the DOLE and at Toyota plants constituted illegal strikes.
Ludwig Teller identifies six (6) categories of an illegal strike:
(1) contrary to a specific prohibition of law, such as strike by employees performing governmental functions; or
(2)violates a specific requirement of law[, such as Article 263 of the Labor Code on the requisites of a valid strike]; or
(3)is declared for an unlawful purpose, such as inducing the employer to commit an unfair labor practice against non-union employees; or
(4)employs unlawful means in the pursuit of its objective, such as a widespread terrorism of non-strikers [for example, prohibited acts under Art. 264(e) of the Labor Code]; or
(5)is declared in violation of an existing injunction[, such as injunction, prohibition, or order issued by the DOLE Secretary and the NLRC under Art. 263 of the Labor Code]; or
(6)is contrary to an existing agreement, such as a no-strike clause or conclusive arbitration clause.
There was an on-going labor dispute arising from Toyota’s refusal to recognize and negotiate with the Union, thus became the subject of the notice of strike filed by the Union on January 16, 2001.
A strike means any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. A labor dispute includes any controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of the employer and the employee.[35]
It is the substance of the situation and not its appearance which is controlling.[36] The term strike encompasses not only concerted work stoppages, but also slowdowns, mass leaves, sit-downs, attempts to damage, destroy, or sabotage plant equipment and facilities, and similar activities.[37]
Once the DOLE Secretary assumes jurisdiction and certifies the case for NLRC compulsory arbitration , parties must revert to the status quo ante, something . that This the Union and individual respondents did not comply with.
There was no work disruption in the two Toyota plants, but the Union and its members picketed and performed concerted actions in front of the Company premises, violating the assumption of jurisdiction and certification Order of the DOLE Secretary. The Union, by its mass actions, inflamed an already volatile situation. The strikes committed from March 17 to April 12, 2001, were initially legal as the legal requirements were met. However, these became illegal because unlawful means were employed, in violation of Art. 264(e).
Union officers are liable for unlawful strikes or illegal acts during a strike. The responsibility of union officials is greater.
Member’s liability depends on participation in illegal acts: when he knowingly participates in an illegal act during a strike. Under [the rule of vicarious liability], mere membership in a labor union serves as basis of liability for acts of individuals, or for a labor activity, done on behalf of the union. The union member is made liable on the theory that all the members are engaged in a general conspiracy, and the unlawful acts of the particular members are viewed as necessary incidents of the conspiracy. It has been said that in the absence of statute providing otherwise, the rule of vicarious liability applies.
Are the 227 striking employees entitled to separation pay? In a slew of cases, the Court did not award separation pay or financial assistance to union officers and members who were separated from service due to their participation in or commission of illegal acts during strikes. Based on existing jurisprudence, the award of separation pay to the Union officials and members in the instant petitions cannot be sustained.
Henceforth the Supreme Court allows separation pay as a measure of social justice only where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. Where the reason for the valid dismissal is, for example, habitual intoxication or an offense involving moral turpitude, like theft or illicit sexual relations with a fellow worker, the employer may not be required to give the dismissed employee separation pay, or financial assistance, or whatever other name it is called, on the ground of social justice.
Compassion for the poor is an imperative of every humane society but only when the recipient is not a rascal claiming an undeserved privilege. Social justice cannot be permitted to be refuge of scoundrels any more than can equity be an impediment to the punishment of the guilty. Those who invoke social justice may do so only if their hands are clean and their motives blameless and not simply because they happen to be poor.
One last point: it is high time that employer and employee cease to view each other as adversaries. When they consider only their own self-interests, and act only with their own benefit in mind, both parties fail to realize that they both have a stake in the business. The employer wants the business to succeed, considering the investment that has been made. The employee in turn, also wants the business to succeed, as continued employment means a living, and the chance to better one’s lot in life. If this becomes a source of conflict, there are various, more amicable means of settling disputes and of balancing interests that open avenues for understanding and cooperation between the employer and the employee. Even though strikes and lockouts have been recognized as effective bargaining tools, they only provide short-term solutions by forcing concessions from one party; but staging such strikes would damage the working relationship between employers and employees, thus endangering the business that they both want to succeed. The more progressive and truly effective means of dispute resolution lies in mediation, conciliation, and arbitration, which do not increase tension but instead provide relief from them. In the end, an atmosphere of trust and understanding has much more to offer a business relationship than the traditional enmity that has long divided the employer and the employee.
ILO CONVENTION ON THE RIGHT ORGANIZE
2nd DIVISION G.R. No. 114974 June 16, 2004 STANDARD CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES UNION (NUBE), vs MA. NIEVES R. CONFESOR CALLEJO, SR., J.: petition for certiorari under Rule 65
The Philippines is a signatory to the International Labor Organization Convention (ILO) No. 87 FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE which states:
"workers and employers, without distinction whatsoever, shall have the right to establish and, subject only to the rules of the organization concerned, to job organizations of their own choosing without previous authorization."
Article 2 of ILO Convention No. 98 pertaining to the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining, provides:
Article 2
1. Workers’ and employers’ organizations shall enjoy adequate protection against any acts or interference by each other or each other’s agents or members in their establishment, functioning or administration.
2. In particular, acts which are designed to promote the establishment of workers’ organizations under the domination of employers or employers’ organizations or to support workers’ organizations by financial or other means, with the object of placing such organizations under the control of employers or employers’ organizations within the meaning of this Article.
These ILO Conventions are incorporated in our Labor Code, particularly in Article 243:
ART. 243. COVERAGE AND EMPLOYEES’ RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZATION. – All persons employed in commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises and in religious, charitable, medical or educational institutions whether operating for profit or not, shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join, or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for purposes of collective bargaining. Ambulant, intermittent and itinerant workers, self-employed people, rural workers and those without any definite employers may form labor organizations for their mutual aid and protection.
It is also found Articles 248 and 249, the Labor Code provision on Unfair Labor Practices .
Although these ILO Conventions were ratified on December 29, 1953, there was already a protection to labor provision in the general provisions of th 1935 Constitution. It was in the 1973 Constitution where it became a declared State policy to afford protection to labor, and assuring the workers’ rights to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. In the 1987 Constitution, it became a policy to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare," and one section emphasized protection to labor, and "the principle of shared responsibility" between workers and employers to promote industrial peace.
The Philippines is a signatory to the International Labor Organization Convention (ILO) No. 87 FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE which states:
"workers and employers, without distinction whatsoever, shall have the right to establish and, subject only to the rules of the organization concerned, to job organizations of their own choosing without previous authorization."
Article 2 of ILO Convention No. 98 pertaining to the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining, provides:
Article 2
1. Workers’ and employers’ organizations shall enjoy adequate protection against any acts or interference by each other or each other’s agents or members in their establishment, functioning or administration.
2. In particular, acts which are designed to promote the establishment of workers’ organizations under the domination of employers or employers’ organizations or to support workers’ organizations by financial or other means, with the object of placing such organizations under the control of employers or employers’ organizations within the meaning of this Article.
These ILO Conventions are incorporated in our Labor Code, particularly in Article 243:
ART. 243. COVERAGE AND EMPLOYEES’ RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZATION. – All persons employed in commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises and in religious, charitable, medical or educational institutions whether operating for profit or not, shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join, or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for purposes of collective bargaining. Ambulant, intermittent and itinerant workers, self-employed people, rural workers and those without any definite employers may form labor organizations for their mutual aid and protection.
It is also found Articles 248 and 249, the Labor Code provision on Unfair Labor Practices .
Although these ILO Conventions were ratified on December 29, 1953, there was already a protection to labor provision in the general provisions of th 1935 Constitution. It was in the 1973 Constitution where it became a declared State policy to afford protection to labor, and assuring the workers’ rights to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. In the 1987 Constitution, it became a policy to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare," and one section emphasized protection to labor, and "the principle of shared responsibility" between workers and employers to promote industrial peace.
Bargaining in bad faith
1st DIVISION G.R. No. L-32387 August 19, 1975 NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, vs NDC EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS' UNION and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, MAKASIAR, J.: petition for certiorari
1. Where the state or a government entity descends to the level of a private enterprise by entering into contracts with private individuals or firms, it divests itself of its sovereign character and its immunity from suits.
2. The complaint primarily charges the petitioner NDC with unfair labor practice—bargaining in bad faith. It is the allegation of the complaint which determines the jurisdiction of the court.
3. A refusal to comply with the terms of a collective bargaining agreement constitutes bargaining in bad faith and an unfair labor practice (Majestic & Republic Theaters Employees Association [PAFLU] vs. CIR, et. al., L-1260, Feb. 28, 1962, 4 SCRA 457, 462).
4. The rule regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute (Dauan vs. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, L-19547, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 SCRA 223; Gravador vs. Mamigo, L-24989, July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA 742; Milleres vs. Subido, L-23281, Aug. 10, 1967, 20 SCRA 954). The rule may be relaxed where the protestant has no other recourse (Sta. Maria vs. Lopez, L-30773, Feb. 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 637), or where there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention (Gonzales vs. Hechanova, L-21897, Oct. 22, 1963, 9 SCRA 230; Abaya vs. Villegas, L-25641, Dec. 17, 1966, 18 SCRA 1034; Mitra vs. Subido, L-21691, Sept. 15, 1967, 21 SCRA 127).
In the present case, considering that the company had closed all avenues for the union to secure favorable action on its demand, ... primary resort to grievance procedures is not logical and proper.
1. Where the state or a government entity descends to the level of a private enterprise by entering into contracts with private individuals or firms, it divests itself of its sovereign character and its immunity from suits.
2. The complaint primarily charges the petitioner NDC with unfair labor practice—bargaining in bad faith. It is the allegation of the complaint which determines the jurisdiction of the court.
3. A refusal to comply with the terms of a collective bargaining agreement constitutes bargaining in bad faith and an unfair labor practice (Majestic & Republic Theaters Employees Association [PAFLU] vs. CIR, et. al., L-1260, Feb. 28, 1962, 4 SCRA 457, 462).
4. The rule regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute (Dauan vs. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, L-19547, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 SCRA 223; Gravador vs. Mamigo, L-24989, July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA 742; Milleres vs. Subido, L-23281, Aug. 10, 1967, 20 SCRA 954). The rule may be relaxed where the protestant has no other recourse (Sta. Maria vs. Lopez, L-30773, Feb. 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 637), or where there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention (Gonzales vs. Hechanova, L-21897, Oct. 22, 1963, 9 SCRA 230; Abaya vs. Villegas, L-25641, Dec. 17, 1966, 18 SCRA 1034; Mitra vs. Subido, L-21691, Sept. 15, 1967, 21 SCRA 127).
In the present case, considering that the company had closed all avenues for the union to secure favorable action on its demand, ... primary resort to grievance procedures is not logical and proper.
KIOK LOY RULING:BARGAINING IN BAD FAITH
2nd DIVISION G.R. No. L-54334 January 22, 1986 KIOK LOY SWEDEN ICE CREAM PLANT, vs. NLRC et.al. CUEVAS, J.: Petition for certiorari
1. Collective bargainingis a mutual responsibility and legal obligation of the employer and the Union. Under Article 249, par.(g) of the Labor Code, it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse "to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with respect to wages, hours of work, and all other terms and conditions of employment including proposals for adjusting any grievance or question arising under such an agreement and executing a contract incorporating such agreement, if requested by either party.
2. The employer is not duty-bound to initiate contract negotiations. The collective bargaining process is set in motion only when the following jurisdictional preconditions are present, namely,
(1) possession of the status of majority representation of the employees' representative thorugh any of the means of selection or designation provided for by the Labor Code;
(2) proof of majority representation; and
(3) a demand to bargain under Article 251, par. (a) of the New Labor Code.
All these preconditions are present in the present case.
3. The totality of the conduct of the Company shows disregard of, and failure to live up to the duty to bargain in good faith. It is guilty of unfair labor practice. Despite union being a a certified bargaining agent and having filed twice a request to bargain, the Company did not answer or act on such. , nor did the COmpany make any counter-proposal == all these indicate lack of a sincere desire to negotiate. The COmpany continued even during the compulsory arbitration stage: it stalled negotitation with repeated postponements; non-appearance at the hearing conducted, and undue delay in submitting its financial statements. All these show its unwillingness to negotiate and reach an agreement with the Union.
The actuations of the Company run counter ti the policy enshrined in the New Labor Code towards expediting settlement of economic disputes.
On its claim that the Collective Bargaining Agreement approved and adopted by the NLRC is a total nullity for lack of the company's consent, and itr argument that once the Collective Bargaining Agreement is implemented, the Company will face the prospect of closing down because the amount of economic benefits it has to pay the Union will equal or exceed its capital: it should have presented its stand before the Labor Arbiter .
Neither party is compelled to accept or agree to the proposals of the other. But an erring party cannot be allowed the impunity feign negotiations by going through empty gestures. The case was certififed to the NLRC after conciliation efforts failed. This Court must accord deference to its findings of reasonableness of any Collective Bargaining Agreement by the employees and management .
1. Collective bargainingis a mutual responsibility and legal obligation of the employer and the Union. Under Article 249, par.(g) of the Labor Code, it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse "to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with respect to wages, hours of work, and all other terms and conditions of employment including proposals for adjusting any grievance or question arising under such an agreement and executing a contract incorporating such agreement, if requested by either party.
2. The employer is not duty-bound to initiate contract negotiations. The collective bargaining process is set in motion only when the following jurisdictional preconditions are present, namely,
(1) possession of the status of majority representation of the employees' representative thorugh any of the means of selection or designation provided for by the Labor Code;
(2) proof of majority representation; and
(3) a demand to bargain under Article 251, par. (a) of the New Labor Code.
All these preconditions are present in the present case.
3. The totality of the conduct of the Company shows disregard of, and failure to live up to the duty to bargain in good faith. It is guilty of unfair labor practice. Despite union being a a certified bargaining agent and having filed twice a request to bargain, the Company did not answer or act on such. , nor did the COmpany make any counter-proposal == all these indicate lack of a sincere desire to negotiate. The COmpany continued even during the compulsory arbitration stage: it stalled negotitation with repeated postponements; non-appearance at the hearing conducted, and undue delay in submitting its financial statements. All these show its unwillingness to negotiate and reach an agreement with the Union.
The actuations of the Company run counter ti the policy enshrined in the New Labor Code towards expediting settlement of economic disputes.
On its claim that the Collective Bargaining Agreement approved and adopted by the NLRC is a total nullity for lack of the company's consent, and itr argument that once the Collective Bargaining Agreement is implemented, the Company will face the prospect of closing down because the amount of economic benefits it has to pay the Union will equal or exceed its capital: it should have presented its stand before the Labor Arbiter .
Neither party is compelled to accept or agree to the proposals of the other. But an erring party cannot be allowed the impunity feign negotiations by going through empty gestures. The case was certififed to the NLRC after conciliation efforts failed. This Court must accord deference to its findings of reasonableness of any Collective Bargaining Agreement by the employees and management .
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